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Abstract 
Alberti identifies the great driver of man into society as the deficiency of his 
unassisted powers to supply his needs. Man’s succour is provided on the one hand 
by the family. On the other, society is conceived as a system for the distribution, 
among members unacquainted with one another, of goods. The relations, in A lberti’s 
thinking, of these contrasting instruments of support are discussed. 
 
Alberti’s Third Grace: Familial, Moral and Civil Society 
 
A ll the while that exchange has advanced as the mode of social intercourse, other 
forms of interaction have retreated. Exchange being an essentially mathematical kind 
of engagement whereby participants are able to put a value on their own side of the 
account,  self-interest always promises to be rewarded. It can come to seem the single 
end with regard to which people interact socially. This point probably applies 
generally. However, here, the discussion limits itself to Italy. 
There are signs that in Early Modern Italy the ascendency of the market and the 
unit of exchange were observable to the degree that the decline of other kinds of 
social engagement seemed to be threatened. A prominent alternative form, like 
charitable patronage, can of course be construed as no different –a commercial act, 
carried out for the sake of the donor’s salvation; that is, one utterly self-interested. 
But, less cynically, it can also be read on occasion as a counter-thrust to the 
rampaging economy of exchange. Might it not be an action seeking truly to reward 
others and not the giver? At any rate, there was an argument to be advanced in 
favour of altruism and liberality, a mode of action that recommended itself alone and 
disdained advantage. It was one accompanied, it can be imagined, by the dark 
thought that they were fated to pass from human life. 
The relations of social and political engagement, market exchange, and civic and 
personal virtue were of great concern in early 15th-century Italy, especially in Tuscany. 
Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406), Leonardo Bruni (c.1370-1444), Poggio Bracciolini (1380-
1459) and Matteo Palmieri (1406-1475) were among those who engaged in debates on the 
question of their definition and how they interacted.1 Leon Battista Alberti (1404-72), too, 
enquired into the nature of civil society –its economic activity, its moral character and its 
political form. He also presented it in observable and allegorical terms. 
He recommended a subject for painters, in Book III of De pictura/ Della pittura 
(1435-36), The Three Graces: 
                                                 
1 ‘Civic Humanism’ was their common ideal, in the coining of Hans Baron.  See, Hans Baron, 
The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an 
Age of Classicism and Tyranny, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1955.  It 
has been a theme of very considerable historiographical importance, prompting recently the 
collection of a set of essays putting it to the test. See, Renaissance Civic Humanism: 
Reappraisals and Reflections, Edited by James Hankins, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2000. 
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Through these three youthful sisters, to whom Hesiod gave the names 
Aglaia, Euphrosyne and Thalia, painted smiling and holding hands, dressed 
in flowing and spotless gowns, the aim was to demonstrate liberality, for 
one sister gives a kindness, another receives it, and the third gives it back 
again.2 
Here was a theme of antique morality that the painter might attempt.3 A lberti lays 
out the happy state of things where giving and receiving take place –but not self-
interestedly. And not reciprocally; that is, not where just two parties are involved. 
The gift is returned by the Grace who did not receive it in the first place: the second 
Grace did not repay a debt to the first. This is a state of liberality. Society is in its 
most evolved form where liberality prevails. For there to be society of this sort, 
A lberti must be interested in the welfare of someone with whom he is personally 
unacquainted, as the third Grace is unknown to the first. That person will gain a 
measure of security as a result. She also, by having the same thought, contributes to 
A lberti’s. So, for everybody. Society and its epitome, the city, are based upon this 
projected intelligence –on the  recognition of our identity of interest with people 
whose benevolent existence we take on trust. 
A lberti made the same point at the end of Book III of De Familia. The discussion has 
turned to friendship. Giannozzo Alberti, who has been the principal interlocutor in 
this part of the dialogue, recalls that, in the first place, he had come to visit Ricciardo 
Alberti and to attend Lorenzo, who was in extremis. He was able to do so because a 
legal proceeding of some sort [in Palagio] at which he intended to represent his 
friend had been postponed.4 He will return to the court tomorrow, «…and this work 
of charity pleases me, to sustain and aid him [my friend] as much as I can in action 
and word, and [I do] this not so much because I know that he loves me as because I 
know him to be good and just. For the good all wish themselves to be considered 
friends, and though they may not be known to you, the good and the virtuous 
always wish to love and to assist…»5 It is not acquaintance but virtue that prompts 
us to charitable behaviour. 
                                                 
2LEON BATTISTA ALBERTI, Opere Volgari, a cura di Cecil Grayson, Vol.III: Trattati d’arte, 
Ludi rerum mathematicarum, Grammatica della lingua toscana, Opusoli amatori, Lettere, 
Bari: Laterza, 1973, De pictura, Book III, §54, p.95: «Quid tres illae iuvenculae sorores, 
quibus Hesiodus imposuit nomina Egle, Euphronensis atque Thalia, quas pinxere implexis 
inter se manibus ridentes, soluta et perlucida veste ornatas, ex quibus liberalitatem 
demonstratam esse voluere, quod una sororum det, alia accipiat, tertia reddat beneficium.» 
3The corresponding subject –treating vice rather than virtue– would be the Calumny of 
Apelles, §53. 
4LEON BATTISTA ALBERTI, I Libri della Famiglia, a cura di Ruggiero Romano e Alberto 
Tenenti, Nuova edizione a cura di Francesco Furlan, Torino: Einaudi Editore, 1994 (ROMANO, 
TENENTI, FURLAN), p.194 
5ID., p.319, l.3748-3753: «…e piacemi questa opera di pietà, sollevarlo [his friend] e aiutarlo 
con fatti e con parole quanto io posso, e questo non tanto perché conosco lui ama me, quanto 
perché conosco lui essere buono e giusto.  E voglionsi e’ buoni tutti riputare amici, e benché a 
te non siano conoscente, e’ buoni e virtuosi voglionsi sempre amare e aiutare.» 
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Vitruvius describes our first, most primitive social state, right at the edge of the 
State of Nature where we have dwelt, as he says, like wild beasts.6 H is starting point 
is hunter-man (the Golden Age, by contrast, contemplates the first, gatherer-man). 
Centuries on, Hobbes thinks that we have not truly moved beyond it –the multiplied 
forms of civilization merely veiling or trimming our savage state. However, while 
acknowledging the ugliness of human nature –of savage man– Vitruvius takes a 
more positive view of social man. He tells the story of our discovery of fire, bringing 
our realization of  the value of cooperation, the start of our emergence from the 
aboriginal state of total self-reliance and self-interest, and the first step of our 
advance towards civilization. The fire of Vitruvius sees us realizing the value of 
reciprocity in a general sense. I’ll put a log on the fire and then you do so too: you 
warm me and I’ll warm you. However, this is not a direct exchange. The crucial 
novelty is the third element, external to both of us and from which we both derive 
gratification. Here, it is the fire: it could equally be the flock or the field or the store. 
Unlike savage man, social man does not thrive at another’s expense. 
Our companion participates in the common task too –and observably. Around the 
fire, and close to it in evolutionary terms, prevails a primitive economy. The social 
existence that Vitruvius conceives at this early stage is limited by the need to be able 
to verify directly that a member of the group has done his share of the fire-feeding. 
The equality that exists within it makes for peace and benevolence. The band will not 
be numerous, for surveillance must never nod, to be infected by doubt, as happens in 
larger groups. This is a family in theory and sentiment, a group whose bonds are 
convivial (in the Latinate sense of the word) –to be contrasted with the family in 
reality, where consanguinity is the connection. 
In this early social arrangement, the group is more than the blood-bound family. 
There, relations are without that balance of give-and-take that defines economic 
society. In the family, siblings may squabble, but mother, father, sisters and brothers 
give and take without any developed sense of equity. In Vitruvius’s nascent society, 
by contrast, the looser bonds of the group or tribe or clan must rest on the firm 
grounds of fairness. That is, of course, a moral and rational perception. In other 
words, as the fire is external to all the individuals of the group and is a care they 
have in common, objectivity has entered the scene –it is a concept (a good) as well as 
a thing in itself– and the event of its discovery coincides with the awakening of 
human self-realization, the acquisition of intellect. 
Where Vitruvius presents the scene as a historic one, it is, of course, as Hobbes’s 
receptiveness to the general notion of the savage in man indicates, perennial in the 
economics it describes. The present discussion, then, cannot insist that the past is 
entirely another country. It must be allowed to touch upon thinking that we treat as 
historically unconditioned. 
If a person only has reciprocal encounters to sustain his benevolence, his security 
only extends to his immediate circle. It is a pre-urban state of things and does not 
constitute society evolved much beyond its first primitive beginnings. Though 
physically we may live in the city, in our conduct we may yet live a pre-urban life. 
                                                 
6VITRUVIUS, The Ten Books on Architecture, translated by Morris Hicky Morgan, New York: 
Dover Publications Inc., 1960, Book II, Chapter 1, pp.38-39 
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People who seek to extend their circle by means of direct bonds of loyalty and 
advantage and who will not adopt the projected intelligence referred to above, may 
exist in the modern epoch:  but they do not live –that is, act– in it. They betray, or at 
any rate, compromise political society and the city, whose key feature is its crucial 
impersonality. Patronage systems work on the primitive principle of invigilated 
reciprocity. It is the modus operandi of the Mafia. The famous claim that «It’s 
business» is skewed. It’s personal. So, the peace and benevolence that are to be found 
at this level of reciprocity are not truly moral states of existence or sentiments. Back-
scratching is not moral action, for it is without trust and hope, containing, as it does, 
the guarantee of reward for labour. Morality exists where reward is unpredictable, 
and some sort of measure must be applied. Sentiments around the perfect reciprocity 
of the one-to-one relationship, or the wider but invigilated one, are no more than 
detached instances of the agreeable. 
These people also betray or compromise the condition that is prior to the city and 
political society, namely the town and moral society. Within moral society there 
prevails a moral economy where the self-evident evils of bribe and threat as the 
instruments of social cohesion must be repudiated. As Vitruvius’s scene expands, a 
more developed notion of society emerges, this time with, at its core, exchange, a 
freely-entered relationship replacing the more coercive one with which we began –
for woe betide whoever would have shirked his duty to feed the fire, or tend the 
sheep, do his share of the husbandry, guard the store. At length, our numbers have 
increased to the point where we cannot perform our invigilated task or make an 
equitable distribution of its rewards. There was an optimum number in the convivial 
little tribe. We have now multiplied as groups: but coming together on market day to 
barter our goods is not too distant from our first gathering round the fire. The market 
is the candid scene of distribution, as the fire distributed its warmth. I, who have a 
sheep and want a goat, rejoice in the equity of my transaction with the man who has 
the goat and wants the sheep. After the anxiety of the search, our encounter was one 
of mutual delight. To the extent that we have given and received happiness, our 
actions can seem to have had –albeit primitively– a moral character. However, to 
repeat, our delight was quite unconnected with generosity in either party. It was 
merely the opposite of the want and surplus that gave us both pain. 
The market becomes, of course, much more efficient when I can split the 
transaction in two. If I can dispose of my surplus sheep in one contact and acquire 
my needed goat in another –make two halves of the equity– I shall find the two 
contacts much more readily than the one. This division has been made possible by 
the unit of exchange. I sell the sheep for a sum, and I buy the goat for one. 
At the same time as the unit of exchange comes into existence, moral life expands. 
By «moral» we mean no more that those feelings, pleasurable and disagreeable, that 
emerge with social conduct in a world in which value is not constant and predictable. 
I was relieved of the pain of my surplus in one transaction, and of  what I lacked, in 
the other. And a crucial speculative element appears. I used to be delighted to 
encounter the person with my surplus and need in mirror image. It may be that mine 
was a fine sheep and his was a poor goat; but we had no real way of registering the 
difference in quality. It was probably invisible to us. Our exchange was not 
accompanied by fully moral considerations either because there was no degree to our 
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satisfaction, and morality is essentially a matter of setting actions upon a scale of 
some sort. It is in this respect that the moral is also the aesthetic, a matter essentially 
of evaluation or comparison. Now, in the market using a unit of exchange, as well as 
the relief of the pains of surplus and deficiency, one transaction is attended by a 
shadow of fear and the other by one of anger. The fear comes with the thought that I 
may not have enough money to buy the goat or may be unable to buy one of 
sufficient quality. The anger comes with the seed of doubt that I have paid too much 
for this goat. The unit of exchange is interested in quality; there is a good goat and a 
poor one. This power of discrimination is of a certain ethical and therefore moral 
character. Again, the moral and the aesthetic are connected. These emotions –fear 
and anger– signify that the market has acquired a moral climate. It resides in our 
sense of the instability of the value of commodities in relation to one another because 
of the stability of the unit of exchange, and in themselves, depending upon whether 
they are in scarce supply or glut. In foresight and hindsight there is this unease or 
unhappiness. When the transactions have been successfully completed, to that 
extent, I am happy. But the accompanying unhappinesses paradoxically enrich my 
life beyond the undifferentiated Edenic agreeableness of my earlier economic 
existence. 
If the market acquires a moral character when a unit of exchange appears, the 
society that emerges through the notion of exchange has moral character too. We 
have more than our common comfort –the fire– with which to concern ourselves.  
There is a service I can offer and there is a requirement that I have. As in the crude 
market, there is little chance of my finding another person with his ability to do a 
service while standing in need of one in mirror-image of mine. 
A lberti discovers a sort of market of a more amplified kind. I can gratify my 
deficiency and benefit another by disbursing what I have in surplus. Within the 
moral economy that he describes above by means of the Three Graces is a round of 
giving, receiving and returning to the first giver. As in the market of the unit of 
exchange, the individual gives and receives a service, but they are not from the same 
person. Of crucial importance is the invisibility of the connection between the person 
whom I serve and the person from whom I receive service. In the allegorical version 
of the exchange system, A lberti reduces the number in the transaction to the smallest 
–three. The sheep, the unit of exchange and the goat stand in a similar relationship. 
The unit of exchange made the sheep and the goat invisible to one another. But there 
was a difference, and it was one upon which A lberti fixed. The moral character of the 
society of exchange was limited by the economy of self-interest which required that 
the price be just right. That character is little more than an unintended consequence. 
The concept of altruism, however, demands that morality of the purest kind be the 
driver of society. A lberti did not intend that commerce should prevail in all 
circumstances. The advance of the market economy –when nothing is to be got for 
nothing– sees the enfeeblement of the moral economy. A champion of moral steel 
was needed. It was the role of liberality –which steadfastly refuses to calculate 
advantage– to set a limit on that advance and, in the end, be commerce’s nemesis. 
The cynic can accuse A lberti of utopianism: self-interest cannot be driven from a 
money economy. But A lberti would observe that barter or the unit of exchange 
oversee reciprocity. Reciprocity cannot, of itself, resolve the prior situation that 
A lberti has in view. 
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He describes the liberal state of things without recourse to allegory in De familia, in 
the voice of Lionardo Alberti: 
…nature willed it that where I might be deficient, you would make good the 
shortcoming, and in another instance you would lack what another might have. 
Why is this? So that I should have need of you, and you of him, he of another, and 
some other of me. In this way one man’s need for another serves as the cause and 
means to keep us all united in open friendship and alliance. And it was this 
necessity perhaps, that was the origin and basis of the establishment of civil 
society and of the construction of the legal system, much more than, as has been 
said, fire or water was the cause of such a great interconnected union of mortals 
bound in law, reason and custom.7 
Any number of people might have been giving and receiving services in the round 
that finally arrives back at A lberti, and supplies him with what he needed. A 
transaction or a number of transactions to which he was not party have taken place, 
and his first act of dispensing his surplus at last receives its reward in his being 
provided with what he needed. In the totality of participants in the moral economy 
of giving and receiving service is society proper. In the balance of deficiencies and 
surpluses across a number of social individuals engaged in exchange there prevails a 
sentiment. The emotions that it sifts are not the fear and anger of the monetary 
exchange. Instead, he arrives with the possibility of liberality and gratitude as his 
moral conditions. They have been fulfilled in a sentiment of charity given and 
received.  Clearly, the moral economy exists in a state of plenty, and no one seeks 
profitable advantage. Battista, the principal interlocutor, in De iciarchia, states,  
«Finally, the existence and continuance both of the family and of the city subsists in 
the availability and sufficiency of necessities, whatever they might be, supplied by 
nature.»8 
He meditates on the same point where money exists, in Book I, saying, «…money 
cannot be useful to you if others do not already have some desire or need whereby 
                                                 
7ROMANO, TENENTI, FURLAN, p.166, l.1886-1895: «…volse [la natura] che in quello in 
quale io manco, ivi tu supplisca, e in altra cosa manchi la quale sia apresso di quell' 
altro.  Perché questo? Perch' io abbia di te bisogno, tu di colui, colui d'uno altro, e 
qualche uno di me, e così questo aver bisogno l'uno uomo dell'altro sia cagione e 
vinculo e conservarci insieme con publica amicizia e congiunzione. E forse questa 
necessità fu essordio e principio de fermare le republice, di costituirvi le leggi molto più 
che come diceva [...] fuoco o d'acque essere stato cagione di tanta fra gli uomini e sì con 
legge, ragione e costumi colligata unione de' mortali.» See also, RENÉE NEU WATKINS, 
The Family in Renaissance Florence, Columbia, South Carolina: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1969, p.137: «…nature planned that where I might be weak, you would 
make good the deficiency, and in some way you would lack the virtue found in another. 
Why this? So that I should have need of you, and you of him, he of another, and some 
other of me. In this way one man’s need for another serves as the cause and means to 
keep us all united in general friendship and alliance.» 
8LEON BATTISTA ALBERTI, Opere Volgari, a cura di Cecil Grayson, Vol. II: Rime e trattati 
morali,  Bari: Laterza, 1966, De iciarchia, Book III, p.266-267, l.35-3: «Ultimo, quello che 
contiene l'essere e perseveranza insieme sì delle famiglie sì delle città si è l'uso e sufficienza 
delle cose necessarie e devute alla natura, qualunque elle siano.» 
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you can convert your money into their labour or products.»9 A lberti is remarkably 
close to Adam Smith here in insisting upon the posteriority of money. 
A lberti goes on to picture the next state of things in De familia, as we saw above in 
the form of the «great interconnected union of mortals bound in law, reason and 
custom.» The implication is that custom gives rise to reason and reason, to laws. But 
he does not expose the mechanics of the process. We are left with evolution as the 
explanation, and continuity rendering arbitrary the categoric distinction that should 
be drawn between moral society and civil society. Indeed, it may be that A lberti does 
not see categoric distinctions between the three kinds of society that are being 
discussed here. By using the family as the building block of society in De familia, he 
implicitly denies them distinct categoric realms. The family, no matter how 
incorporated and fitted to advanced economic operation, retains memory of its pre-
social and pre-economic existence as the narrow consanguineous circle. By putting 
its interest first, the acts of kindness between its member fall short of altruism, for 
there is no giving without benefit sought for the whole. But it will be a more evolved 
family if it w ill recognise its advantage in the peace of the society at large. At any 
rate, the pattern of moral society is indeed the same as that of civil society, which 
embraces the totality of relationships and makes the vast majority of them invisible 
to members of  that society. The invisibility of the multitude of benefactors in society 
conceived as a moral economy, matching in the mechanics of its operation the 
market with a unit of exchange, recurs in civil society. 
A lberti had conceived of moral society in terms of the Graces and of the villa. 
Managed with diligence and love, it never wearies of repaying you. Reward 
follows reward. In spring the farm gives you a multitude of delights; greenery, 
flowers, aromas, songs. It tries to please you, it smiles and promises you a 
magnificent harvest, it fills you with good hopes as well as sufficient joy in the 
present. Then in summer how courteously it attends on you! First one sort of fruit, 
then another, comes to your house - your house is never empty of some gift. Then 
there is autumn: now the farm gives liberal reward for your labors, shows great 
gratitude for your merit - gladly, copiously, and faithfully serves you! Twelvefold 
reward is yours - for a little sweat, many casks of wine.10 
There is an invisible magic-worker here. A generous and fecund spirit converts our 
small labour into the plenty that comes to our door. In the villa and the emblem of 
liberality –the Three Graces– Alberti presents a moral economy distinct from a 
                                                 
9De iciarchia, Book I, p.214, l.3-5: «…l'oro non potrà essere utile a te, se prima in altri non 
viene qualche voglia o bisogno pel quale tu commuti l'oro tuo coll'opere e cose sue.» 
10ROMANO, TENENTI, FURLAN, Book III, pp.244-245, l.1515-1527: «Se tu la governi con 
diligenza e con amore, mai a lei parerà averti satisfatto; sempre agiunge premio a’ premii. 
Alla primavera la villa ti dona infiniti sollazzi, verzure, fiori, odori, canti; sforzasi in piu  
modi farti lieto, tutta ti ride e ti promette grandissima ricolta, émpieti di buona speranza e di 
piaceri assai. Poi e quanto la truovi tu teco cortese! Ella ti manda a casa ora uno, ora un altro 
frutto, mai ti lascia la casa vòta di qualche sua liberalità. Eccoti poi presso l’autunno. Qui 
rende la villa alle tue fatiche e a’ tuoi meriti smisurato premio e copiosissimo mercé, e quanto 
volentieri e quanto abundate, e con quanta fede! Per uno dodici, per uno piccole sudore piú e 
piú botte di vino.» See also R.N. WATKINS, p.191-192. 
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money economy. It achieves a satisfactory distribution of the goods that we require 
without descending to the meanness of  the balancer of the books (and without the 
cupidity of the seeker of profits). If the crudest society was near to the State of 
Nature, the moral society is close to the state of horticulture and agriculture. Nature 
is viewed in an altogether kinder light. 
And civil society comes next. In itself, it is based on neither reciprocity nor 
morality, but it embraces them in abstract and ideal form. That is, they will be 
present, but they do not shape the society. The first, Vitruvian, society has been 
called convivial or invigilated. The second, moral society, self-regulates in conditions 
of peace and plenty. The third deals with less benign conditions. Civil society keeps 
the peace between men of a more Hobbesian kind. It assumes limited resources that 
need to be distributed in an orderly way. Regulation is required: however, it is not 
coercive (the treatment of delinquents is a separate matter). Rather, the citizens have 
collaborated in creating the instruments or institutions that govern them 
impersonally and without favour. It is possible to propose the rather contradictory 
concept of impersonal benevolence where civil society is concerned. That concept is, 
of course, justice, a resolution forged on the anvil of reason. A lberti was thinking of 
something like this when he wrote of society «bound in law, reason and custom.» 
Law is the fulfilment of objectivity in the government of our affairs. Custom is 
sustained w ithin social intercourse. Reason aims at consensus unsustained by social 
intercourse. Law stands aloof from our quibbles. 
Punitive justice is invented to deal with those who do not participate in civil 
society. In the Renaissance period, as is so well illustrated in the Good and Bad 
Government frescoes by Ambrogio Lorenzetti in the Sala dei Nove of the Palazzo 
della Signoria of Siena, the state recognized its task to administer justice. There 
should be satisfaction for us in having the state, or society, standing behind us as we 
receive satisfaction upon the person who has wronged us. Blood money or vendetta 
continue to gratify us only because we fail to acknowledge the security that we have 
in our benefactors being legion and unknown to us. 
What distinguished the society of need and service from that of custom, reason and 
law is difficult to glean from Alberti’s writings, but he does have a clear conception 
of what civil society is. Or rather, he is very clear about what is destructive of it, and 
from that clarity of thought is to be construed his understanding. In the prologue to 
Book I of De familia, he is very cogent on the point.  Families, like commonwealths 
and empires, thrive or decline: society in its ascendency consists in the universal 
pursuit of common cause. The empire of A lexander the Great serves as the first case 
to introduce ancient Rome, modern Italy and the A lberti family as prominent 
instances of decline following triumph. Famously, A lexander’s empire was divided 
among his generals, and collapse was swift. 
Indeed, after the death of A lexander the Great, as soon as the Macedonian 
princes started each to procure advantages for themselves, and to care not for the 
public realm but attend to their private fiefdoms, discord soon arose among them. 
So, then, not fortune but stupidity brought to an end the felicity of the 
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Macedonians and they found themselves presently without empire and without 
glory.11 
Unity is opposed to division. In Book VII, Chapter 5, of De re ædificatoria, A lberti 
reports an almost incantatory passage, striking repeatedly on the single or unitary 
and marking the perfect condition of a people, this time, under Moses. It is a law of 
the Hebrews: 
Have but one principal and sacred city …in it construct one temple with one 
altar …you should be one people, of common feeling and common purpose … 
and defended by a single god.12 
The general moral point that A lberti takes from the case of the Macedonians is that 
self-interest leads to decline. It is the instinct that is opposed to the social. The point 
is one that he returns to frequently in his writings. Civil society depends, then, upon 
self-denial, and acts through instruments that are not to be deflected from their task 
by individual selfishness. It is clear to see how destructive of empires and 
commonwealths are tyrannies, which turn the instruments of state into those of 
individual will and appetite. 
Institutions themselves are no less vulnerable. What has been described above in 
rough outline is one of A lberti’s most important conceptual tools –his notion of 
society possessing its dynamic principle in our commitment to it as an abstraction.  
The common life, the commonwealth and the common table are its theatre.  The 
Church should have the character of civil society. That, for A lberti, it did not, its 
collapse was certain. 
It might seem that civil society would have to be democratic and egalitarian. Does 
it involve then the dethroning of monarchs? Whilst there are indeed inequalities and 
curtailments of liberties that civil society does not permit, there are others that he 
allows to be consistent with the rule of princes. Battista, in the late dialogue, De 
iciarchia, describes the consensual society where all submit to the law, and says that 
the role of the prince is to exercise coercive command only where people within the 
                                                 
11ID, p.5, l.64-81: «Vero, doppo la morte d'Allessandro Grande, subito ch' e principi 
macedoni cominciarono a procurare e' suoi propri beni, e aversi solliciti non al publico 
imperio, ma curiosi a' privati regni, fra loro subito nacquero discordie.[…] Così adunque 
finirono non la fortuna, ma loro stultizia e' Macedoni la conseguita sua felicità, e trovonsi in 
poco tempo senza imperio e senza gloria.»  See R.N. WATKINS, p.26-27: «True it is that after 
the death of Alexander the Great, as soon as the Macedonian kings began to pursue only their 
private good and to care not for the public empire but for their own kingdoms discord arose 
… among them, […] Thus the Macedonians destroyed, not by fortune but by folly, the 
happiness they had attained. Soon they found themselves without empire and without glory.» 
12LEON BATTISTA ALBERTI, L’Architettura [De re ædificatoria], a cura di Giovanni Orlandi, 
introduzione e note di Paolo Portoghesi, Milano: Polifilo, 1966, Book VII, Chapter 5, p.559: 
«Sit … vobis una primaria et sacra civitas …in ea struito templum unicum, altare unicum … 
una enim gens uno consensu et instituto … una erit deo tuta et munita.» The translation here 
differs very slightly from that in Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art of Building in Ten Books, 
translated by JOSEPH RYKWERT, NEIL LEACH and ROBERT TAVERNOR, Cambridge, 
Mass./London: M.I.T. Press, 1988, p.198-99 [RYKWERT et alii]. Here, ‘purpose’ is given for 
‘undertaking.’ 
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society do not obey.13  The prince’s role in normal circumstances is laid out: «The 
king, insofar as kingship is command, makes clear to his people how much and in 
what ways one should be just, temperate, strong and honest in order to live well and 
not useless to others and to oneself, and in this way he will fulfi l his duty…»14 Not 
the obedience of the ruled proves the prince, but the nature of the order that he gives. 
It will not be inconsistent with justice and liberty among the citizens: «So it follows 
that sovereignty does not concede the right to impose new kinds of servitude upon 
others, but imposes upon that person who rules the civil necessity to conserve the 
liberty and dignity of the patria and the peace of her private citizens.»15 Battista had 
earlier considered the ruler who would rather be feared than loved; so it is possible 
that Machiavelli knew this text or its argument and reversed its pious principles in 
his own cynical tract, Il Principe.16 There is in addition, demanded of the prince by 
A lberti, something that he cannot shirk. That is his selfless attention to the needs of 
the state and her citizens (or his subjects). The demand is not made by the citizens as 
a group of individuals, for then the prince would be attending upon the mob. Rather, 
it is made by the citizens who pool their common purpose in the form of the 
abstraction, which is the institution of the state. A lberti describes the selfless ruler in 
the Intercenale, «Servus», in which the argument is made that the master is the 
servant of his household, and therefore also of the servants. The paterfamilias is a 
form of the prince.  It is a matter of doing one’s duty. The prince is something of a 
teacher in that he instructs the people that they should live honestly, with fortitude, 
with temperance and justice and should be helpful to their fellows, «and so he will 
satisfy his duty, obedient to the servitude placed upon him by the law.»17 In Book III 
of De iciarchia, A lberti allows that in the family or in the city there are two classes –
the many and the few. It is the task of the few to direct policy, to initiate enterprises, 
                                                 
13De iciarchia, p.194, l.12-25: «Costui adunque publico e primo magistrato, e insieme il 
numero de' privati cittadini, se vorranno vivere bene e beati in summa tranquillità e quiete, 
converrà ch'egli osservino equità e onestà fra loro quanto comandi la legge. Questa ragione di 
comandare, se tutti saranno modesti e ben sensati, pare a me sarà non altro che uno essortarli, 
confermarli, sollecitarli che sequitino facendo pur bene come per loro essi fanno. E sarà, dico, 
questa essortazione officio di vera amicizia e compiuta carità più che arrogante elazione, 
cupidità d'imporre servile condizione agli altri. Contro, se forse saranno improbi scellerati, el 
dir tuo “fa e non fare” nulla gioverebbe. Resta per questo al principe che lui ubbidisca alle 
legge, e sia ministro della severità castigando chi erra e provedendo alla quiete degli altri 
levando di mezzo la corruttela e peste de' viziosi.» 
14Îbid., Book III, p.194, l.30-33: «El re in quanto re comanda, cioè ricorda a' suoi quanto e 
dove bisogni aversi iusto, temperato e forte e onesto per vivere bene e non inutile agli altri e 
anche a sé, e così satisfarà all'officio suo …» 
15Ibid.: «Così sequita che il principato non concede arbitrio d'imponere nuova servitù agli 
altri, ma impone a chi lo regge necessità civile di conservare libertà e dignità alla patria e 
quiete a' privati cittadini.» 
16Ibid., Battista, near the beginning of Bk.I, p.192, l.14-17: «E che furore fia questo degli 
animi bestiali, se vorranno più essere temuti che amati? Quanti saranno che temano te, tanti 
odieranno te. Se tu sarai odiato da molti, per certo a te sarà necessario temer molti.» 
 
17Ibid., p.194, l.30-33: «…e cosí satisfará all officio suo ubbidendo alla servitá impostali 
dalle legge.» 
 11 
to deliver the ship of state over rough seas safely to harbour. He refers to, «The duty 
of those more suited to conduct both themselves and others to the best and most 
desirable end.»18 Or, as the interlocutor Paolo says, «It seems useful and indeed 
necessary to us that every multitude should have someone in charge.»19 This master 
who serves and captain who obeys has much in common with the monastic superior 
in the Rule of St Augustine: 
Your superior should not take pleasure in ruling you but rather in serving you 
with all charity. While the honor you pay him exalts him in your eyes, let fear 
prostrate him at your feet before God. He should give an example of good works 
to all. Let him correct the unruly, encourage the fainthearted, comfort the sick, be 
patient with all. Let him observe the rule with cheerfulness himself and cause 
others to observe it by the reverence he inspires. And though both are necessary, 
still it should rather be his desire to be loved than feared by you…20 
Alberti develops the idea of government in civil society –as opposed to its power of 
self-regulation– by observing the microcosmic case, the family. «As far as I can make 
out from nature, it seems that the city, as it is made up of many families, is in itself 
like one very large family, and, equally, the family is as-it-were a small city.»21 As is 
argued in «Servus», there is need for governors and governed to identify with the 
good of the family. As, in the household, the head is a vigilant overseer, prompt in 
his response to circumstances, the paterfamilias also understands his task as being to 
make himself lovable to his children in their recognition that their own welfare and 
happiness is his aim. A lberti relishes the contradiction resolved: the governor serves; 
the commander obeys.22 In one guise, he identifies the good of the social group (it 
might, for the father, be the family), in the other, the sanctity of the Law. Their 
actions are essentially virtuous, and in that they are something of an imitation of 
Christ’s. The person who lives self-sacrificially gives from out of a resource that 
cannot be diminished. Virtú, sapienza and bontá are resources of this kind.23 
A lberti is emphatic in arguing that virtue is a matter of will. It belongs to whoever 
wishes to have it. For example, he writes, in De iciarchia, «He who does not seek his 
own good, cares nothing for it, and who cares not merits not.»24 He repeats just what 
                                                 
18Ibid., p.268, l.14-15: «l'officio de' più atti a inducere e sé e gli altri a fine ottimo e 
desideratissimo.» 
19Ibid.,  p.269, l.11-12: «Parci utile certo e necessario a ogni moltitudine avere chi la 
governi.» Alberti makes the point similarly in Book VII, Chapter 1 of De re ædificatoria 
(RYKWERT et alii, p.189): «It is said Saturn … realized that just as we put a shepherd and not 
one of the cattle in charge of the herd, similarly another race of beings, far superior in wisdom 
and virtue should be left in command of human communities.» 
20http://www.domcentral.org/trad/rule.htm 
21De iciarchia, p.266, l.8-11: «Quanto m’occorre dalla natura, pare a me che la città com’è 
constituita da molte famiglie, così ella in sé sia quasi come una ben grande famiglia; e contro, 
la famiglia sia quasi una picciola città.» 
22Ibid., see p.272 
23ut supra 
24Ibid., Book III, p.199, l.3-4: «Chi non cerca il ben suo, non lo cura: chi non lo cura, non lo 
merita.» 
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he wrote in the prologue to De familia all those years earlier: «Only he who does not 
want it is without virtue.»25 His own good is not the same as his self-interest. Again, 
A lberti is carving out territory where the commercial rule does not apply. The 
commercial principle always involves, stated or implicitly, the Latin word ‘ut’ –in 
order that– a proximate or eventual advantage to oneself. The end directs the act, and 
to that extent, the act is not freely willed. The thing that is wished for its own sake, 
however, stands beyond the reach of the rule. The good father wishes the good of his 
family. Similarly, if the prince will define himself in relation to the good of the 
citizens and if the citizens can trust in the virtue, benevolence and justice of the 
prince, none would wish to be elsewhere than in the society they share. These are 
goods in themselves. 
This prince defines himself here not by his magnificence, but by his liberality, and 
it is the role of liberality –at any rate in domestic as opposed to foreign policy– that 
A lberti is at pains here to demonstrate. Thus, the paterfamilias and the prince share a 
power, and the family and the state are again alike. 
It seems that, from his consideration of society as the sum of families or as a great 
family in itself, A lberti has missed the point that impersonality is the essential 
property of civil society –the family, we recall, being an invigilated scene. But, in fact, 
no sooner has he stated the point than he recognises that, in its dependence upon 
sentiment deriving from consanguinity, it is inadequate to account for the larger 
society: «But perhaps thereafter cities arose spontaneously and for no other reason 
than for living together in sufficiency and comfort.»26 In Book III of De familia, 
Giannozzo explains the working of the family and Lionardo attempts to apply his 
points to the larger society. In this discussion, such a society would belong to the 
town rather than the city. Whilst the family comes about in a spirit of «piety and love 
and a certain sense of duty required by nature towards its members»,27 the town is 
the resort more of the self-interested than the benevolent. However, he says, the 
existence and survival of both proceeds from their ability to supply our necessities 
and what nature provides, and utilities. 
In fact, for A lberti, society or the commonwealth or republic is not constituted 
simply as the sum of its families. The family is not an independent element of 
society, but an element within society. That is, society is the medium of the family, 
and the satisfactory condition of that medium is of crucial importance for its welfare. 
He makes the point right at the beginning of De familia that that condition is the 
product of families’ extraverted conduct. In the prologue, he lists ancient Roman 
families: «They stood in our land for the public good…» They, in their nobility, 
maintain the public good, and they inhabit the society where it prevails, «…for the 
maintenance of liberty, and for the conservation of authority and dignity in peace 
                                                 
25R.N. WATKINS, Book III, p.17: ROMANO TENENTI, FURLAN, p.10, l.220-221: «Solo é sanza 
virtú chi nolla vuole.» 
26De iciarchia., Book III, p.266, l.27-29: «Ma furono poi le città constituite forse a caso, e  
non per altro ragione che solo per vivere con sufficienza e commodità insieme.» 
27Ibid., l.31-2: «pietà e carità e certo officio richiesto dalla natura verso e’ suoi.» 
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and in war.»28 Thus the interest of the family is not the immediate achievement of its 
single destiny, but the conditions in which that goal might be realised. Lionardo 
Alberti says, 
I agree with you that the good citizen will love tranquillity, but no more his own 
than that of others, will take pleasure in private leisure but no less in that of his 
fellow citizens, will desire the unity, composure peace and tranquillity of his own 
family but even more that of his country and state.29 
In fact, this moral state of things is the condition of liberality, as it was in the allegory 
of the Graces. Giannozzo, at the end of  Book III, makes the point that it is not 
reciprocity that maintains the peace in the larger society but the casting of virtue 
upon the waters: «Good men should all consider themselves friends. Even if you do 
not know them personally, you should always love and help good and virtuous 
men.»30 Such is the first Grace’s relationship with the third. That environment whose 
healthfulness was so important for the family traces its origins back to the fire of 
Vitruvius, the ground upon which cooperation stood. 
A lberti, then, makes a sustained argument for social intercourse defiant of 
commercial values and self-interest. Labour and desert receive, happily, incalculable 
reward where liberality prevails. However, it is difficult to think that he makes the 
argument in a sanguine frame of mind. Rather, he makes it against the social current, 
which is towards selfishness and greed. Self-interest can hide and disguise itself so 
effectively; its viciousness can be difficult to expose. In the primitive society 
described by Vitruvius it did not exist, for every action was invigilated by all. The 
societies that followed included, essentially, the unobserved acts of giving and 
receiving. The third Grace can personify them. However, she has a sister. Self-interest 
is her unvirtuous sibling. Where the one acted unobserved, the other operates in 
secret. The advantage that the «Disgrace» who operates in secret has over she who, 
for her part, operates openly is huge. Envy and pride preside over her inner life and 
prompt her every action. Perhaps, emulation residing in the darkest recesses of her 
heart, she is Ambition. At any rate, that secret desire for advantage over others is the 
origin of social catastrophe. For example, Battista, in Cena familiaris makes the point: 
«From contention arises rivalry, from rivalry bull-headedness, from bull-headedness 
injury, from injury offence and strife and [the clash of] arms.»31 A lberti pictured the 
                                                 
28R.N. WATKINS, Book III, p.13; ROMANO, TENENTI, FURLAN, p.3, l.19-21: «… cosí nella 
nostra terra assai state per lo ben publico a mantenere la libertà, a conservare l’autorità e 
dignità della patria in pace e in Guerra …» 
29Ibid., op,cit., p.48: ROMANO, TENENTI, FURLAN, p.225, l.946-952: «E affermovi che il 
buono cittadino amerà la tranquillità, ma non tanto la sua propria, quanto ancora quella degli 
altri buoni, goderà negli ozii privati, ma non manco in quello degli altri cittadini suoi, desiderà 
l’unione, quiete, pace e tranquillità della casa sua propria, ma molto più quella della patria sua 
e della republica.» 
30Ibid., p.115: ROMANO, TENENTI, FURLAN, p.319, l.3751-3753: «E voglionsi e’ buoni tutti 
riputare amici, e benché a te non siano conoscenti, e’ buoni e virtuosi voglionsi sempre amare 
e aiutare.» 
31C. GRAYSON, I, p. 348, l.28-30: «Del contendere surge gara, della gara ostinazione, della 
ostinazione ingiuria, della ingiuria iurgio e rissa e arme.» The Intercenale, «Nebule» (LEON 
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allegorical representation of the third Grace’s evil counterpart in the Intercenale, 
«Paintings»: 
…a woman with a haughty brow, swelling breast, insolent mien. Dressed in 
regal garments, she blows into a broken trumpet, which curves back towards her 
face and pours murky smoke in her eyes. With her other hand, she points a finger 
at jewels and golden vases encrusted w ith reliefs, which have been thrown on the 
ground.32 
Perhaps half-remembered is an allegorical figure that he could have seen while a 
young student in Padua. In the Arena Chapel, among the seven vices, Giotto painted 
Invidia. From out of her mouth comes a snake which turns back to bite her forehead. 
It could be mistaken for a trumpet. There follow in A lberti’s text, descriptions of 





                                                                                                                                                        
BATTISTA ALBERTI, Dinner Pieces, A Translation of the Intercenales by David Marsh, 
Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies In conjunction with The Renaissance Society of 
America: Binghampton, New York, 1987, p.172-175) traces a similar process of disaster 
beginning in ambition. 
32Ibid., p.55  
